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HIGHLIGHTS OF A COMPARATIVE STUDY




One hundred and twenty years have passed since Justice Story made
use of the comparative method in his treatise on conflict of laws. 1 Dur-
ing those years, the importance of comparative law has grown con-
siderably.2 In fact, it is no longer a luxury but a very pragmatic in-
gredient of contemporary legal education.3 No wonder that numerous
sources for the study of comparative law have already been made avail-
able.4  The reasons for this development are multiple. From an aca-
demic point of view, a comparative approach contributes to the under-
standing and the appreciation or criticism of one's own legal system.6
There are, however, more important practical reasons that make it de-
sirable, if not necessary, for lawyers as well as-others to become familiar
with basic principles of foreign law. In solving legislative problems,
legislators frequently face questions which have been the subject of
* Attorney Advisor, Office of the Judge Advocate, Headquarters, U. S. Army,
Europe; Member of the District of Columbia and German (Frankfurt/Main)
Bars; J.U.D. (Breslau, 1929); LL.M. (Tulane, 1941); LL.M. (HarVard, 1942);
contributor of leading articles in various American legal periodicals and European
law journals. The author is greatly indebted to Col. Seymour W. Wurfel, Chief
of the Military Affairs Branch of the aforementioned Office of the Judge Advo-
cate, for suggesting the article.
'Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Sketch of American Law, 3 Am. J. CoMP. LAW
3 (1954) ; Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-One Hun-
dred Years After, 48 HARV. L. REv. 15 (1934); 30 REvUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIoNAL 295 (1935).
'Stone, The End to Be Served by Comparative Law, 25 TULANE L. REV.
325 (1951); La Paulle, The Functions of Comparative Law, 35 HARv. L. Rv.
838 (1922).
'Mayda, The Value of Studying Foreign Law, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 635-656
(1953); Hazard, Comparative Law in Legal Education, 18 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 264
(1951) ; Re, Comparative Law Course in the Law School Curriculum, 1 Am. J.
Comp. LAW 232 (1952) ; Stevenson, Comparative and Foreign Law in American
Law Schools, 50 COL. L. REv. 613 (1950) ; Thayer, Re-Teaching of International
and Comparative Law, 1 J. LEGAL EDuc. 449 (1950) ; Rheinstein, Teaching Com-
parative Law, 5 U. OF CHl. L. REv, 615 (1938) ; Pound, The Place of Comparative
Law in. the American Law School Curriculum, 8 TULANE L. REv. 161 (1934).
4 Szladitz, Note on Translations of Foreign Civil and Commercial Codes, 3 Ams.
J. Comp. LAW 67-72 (1954) ; Rheinstein, Teaching Tools in Comparative Law,
1 Am. J. Cosp. LAW 95-114 (1952).
'Rheinstein, Teaching Tools in Comparative Law, 1 Am. J. Cos p. LAW 104
(1952) ; McDougal, Conservative Study of Law for Policy Purposes, 1 Ams. J.
Comp. LAW 34 (1952).
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legislation in other countries.6 Even though such legislation may not
be readily adaptable, acquaintance with other solutions is certainly use-
ful.
For the judicial branch, the importance of knowledge of basic prin-
ciples of foreign law has existed since the time when American courts
first applied foreign law as a result of pertinent principles of conflict
of laws. True, under the common law rules of evidence the party
having the burden of proof must assert and prove foreign law like any
other facts constituting a cause of action.7  However, aside from the
fact that this rule has been recently relaxed in several states,8 the ulti-
mate task of applying and interpreting foreign law rests with the courts,
even though they may be aided by experts.9 That such aid may actually
result in confusion is best illustrated by the case of Usatorre et al. v. The
Victoria et al.10 This case involved a salvage claim by Claudio Rod-
riguez and others against the motor vessel Victoria which was op-
erated under the flag of Argentina. The salvage was carried out by the
plaintiffs, the ship's own crew, after they had abandoned the ship upon
the captain's orders and without any h6pe of recovery. The defense was
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to an award for salvage, because the
ship ultimately was not wrecked, and, under Argentine law, the voyage
and employment contract had not been terminated. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York did not make
a finding as to Argentine law because it thought that ]us gentium ap-
plied to salvage claims. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the
decision of the District Court, expressing the view "that whether, on
the facts as found, the crew were 'released from any obligation to exert
themselves for the benefit of the vessel,' must be determined as a matter
of the 'internal economy' of the ship, by the Argentine law, the 'law of
the flag.' ,10k Before the trial court the expert witness, an American
citizen and a member of the New York Bar and of the Bars of Cuba
and Puerto Rico, had testified that the provision of the Argentine law
that contracts between seamen and ships are terminated by any disaster
'McDougal, Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarifica-
tion as an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 1 Am. J. ComP. LAW 34
(1952).
' Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L. J. 1018 ft.
(1941) ; Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 Am. J. Comp. LAW
60 (1954).
s Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 Amz. J. Comp. LAW 60
(1954); Schlesinger, Nenere amerikanische Gerichtsentscheidungen, NEUE JURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCH n T 54, 828-829.
o Sommerich and Busch, The Expert Witness and the Proof of Foreign Law,
38 CORNELL L. Q. 125 (1953).
1" Usatorre et al. v. The Victoria et al., 172 F. 2d 434 (2d Cir. 1949). See
comments by Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 Am. J. ComP.
LAW 60-67 (1954).104 Id. at 438.
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rendering the vessel incapable of navigation must be interpreted lit-
erally and that, therefore, the question, whether the vessel was incapable
of navigation depended on the actual facts and not on the captain's judg-
ment. In presenting his opinion, the witness gave little or no attention
to Argentine decisional material. For this reason, the Court of Appeals
questioned the accuracy of the expert's opinion:
"We have no knowledge of Argentine 'law,' nor more than a
vague acquaintance with the judicial methods there prevailing.
But casual readings of readily available material clearly indicate
that, in all civil-law countries, despite conventional protestations
to the contrary, much law is judge-made, and the courts are by
no means unaffected by judicial precedents or 'case law' (which
the civilians call 'jurisprudence,' as distinguished from the inter-
pretation of text-writers or commentators, called 'doctrine').
Recas6ns Siches, a widely respected professor of law in Spain
for many years, now in Mexico, recently wrote: 'Now jurispru-
dence, that is, the decision of the courts, has had the part of
greatest protagonist in the formation of the law; and, although
in much less volume, it continues today of great importance.'
'Both the slavish obedience of [civilian] judges to codes, and
their freedom from precedent are largely a myth,' writes Fried-
man. 'In truth, while there is greater freedom towards the pro-
visions of codes, there is also much greater respect for judicial
authority than imagined by most Anglo-American lawyers.' A
recent treatise by Cossio, a distinguished Argentine lawyer, shows
that this attitude prevails in the Argentine.
"The expert witness' adherence to the literal words of the
code may have caused the trial judge to question his conclusions.
For, we are told, the civilians, influenced by an interpretative
theory which derives from Aristotle (and which has affected
Anglo-American practice as well) are accustomed to interpret
their statutory enactments 'equitably,' i.e., to fill in gaps, arising
necessarily from the generalized terms of many statutes, by
asking how the legislature would have dealt with the 'unprovided
case.' In civil-law countries, 'there are countless examples of
judicial interpretation of statutes * * * which gave the statutory
interpretation a meaning either not foreseen by or openly antago-
nistic to the opinions prevailing at the time of the Code, but in ac-
cordance with modern social development of trends of public
opinion. This attitude finds expression in Art. I of the Swiss
Civil Code [of 1907] which directs the judge to decide as if he
[Vol. 33
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were a legislator, when he finds himself faced with a definite
gap in the statute.' ,1ob
In addition to the legislators and judges, the administrative branch
of the government is faced, more than ever before, with legal issues
which may be determined by the legal systems of foreign countries.
It is no novelty that an "income tax" in a foreign country is not neces-
sarily an "'income tax" within the meaning of Sections 164 and 907 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and, therefore, not subject to credit
or deduction.'"
Another example of the classification problem is furnished by Article
X of the Agreement regarding the Status of the Forces of Parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty. Article X provides that, where the legal inci-
dence of any form of taxation in the receiving State depends upon resi-
dence or domicile, periods during which a member of a Force or civilian
component is in the territory of that State by reason solely of his being
a member of such Force or civilian component shall not be considered
as periods of residence therein, or as creating a change of residence or
domicile for the purpose of such taxation. No doubt, Article X is de-
signed to exempt all members of the Forces in NATO countries from
"taxation" based upon residence or domicile. However, the concept
of "taxation" in the United States is not identical with that in other
NATO countries. Thus, for example, while contributions to social
security (e.g., contributions for unemployment benefits) are considered
taxes in the United States, they are regarded as "contributions" as
distinguished from "taxes" in European countries on the ground that
they are paid in consideration of contingent payments to be made by
the social insurance carrier to the unemployed.
A special impetus has been given to foreign law as a result of the
off-shore procurement program of the United States. Even though
the United States may be exempt from court jurisdiction in regard to
off-shore procurement contracts-either by explicit provision of "Memo-
randa of Understanding"' 2 or by principles of sovereign immunity,'3
10b Id. at 439.
"' Biddle v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 302 U. S. 573 (1938); New
York & Honduras Rosalio Min. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 168
F. 2d 745 (1948) ; Keen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 15 B. T. A. 1243
(1929) ; Eitingon-Schild Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 21 B. T. A.
1163 (1931) ; Schlesinger, Comparative Law Cases and Materials, 364-380 (1950).
2 Memoranda of Understanding exist between the U. S. and the following
countries: Spain-30 July 1954; United Kingdom-30 October 1952; France~
13 May 1952, 8 April 1953, 12 June 1953; Belgium-2 September 1953; Nether-
lands-7 May 1954; Italy-31 March 1954; Denmark-8 June 1954; Norway-
10 March 1954; Yugoslavia-18 October 1954.
" As to the United States, see Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting and
Sovereign Immunity, 47 Am. J. INT'L. L. 93 (1953) ; as to Great Britain, see
Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdiction at Immunities of Foreign States, 1951
British Year Book of International Law 220; as to Germany, see Schwenk,
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as applied in the country in which suit is brought-it does not follow
that the United States is exempt from the applicability of foreign law
where applicable rules of conflict of laws require the application of for-
eign law in the absence of specific stipulations to the contrary.' 4 Sim-
ilar difficulties exist in interpreting Treaties of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, Agreements to Avoid Double Taxation, etc.
Finally, a great number of United States military personnel and de-
pendents are stationed in foreign countries, either as occupation forces or
for defense purposes. Legal problems of a civil nature involving the
law of contracts, torts, property, and domestic relations arise under the
law of the country in which they are stationed and frequently in the
courts of that country. Until recently, Occupation Courts in Germany,
staffed with American judges, applied German civil and criminal law
in cases of which the court had jurisdiction. 15 Frequently the parties
involved in such cases before these courts, whether American or German,
were represented by American attorneys who had been admitted by the
United States High Commissioner for Germany and by Headquarters,
United States Army, Europe, to practice law in Occupation Courts in
Germany. Now, such civil litigation is conducted almost exclusively
in the German courts.16
II. GENERAL FEATURES DISTINGUISHING COMMON AND CIVIL LAW
a. Judge-made law in civil law countries
While it is true that in civil law countries all law is statutory, the
most authoritative interpretation and construction is furnished by the
courts. 7 In this respect, the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court
in the case of Breedlove v. Turner s8 appears to characterize most aptly
the situation prevailing not only in Louisiana but also in other civil-law
states. In this case, the defendant, an attorney-at-law, based his defense
against an action for damages for malpractice on the ground that he was
not required to know the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court,
Ausschluss fremder Staaten von den deutschen Gerichtsbarkeit, NEUE JURISTISCUE
WOCHENSciF-r 55, 1596 (1955) and Domcke, Immunity of Foreign States from
German Jurisdiction, 48 Amt. J. IN'L. L. 302 (1954).
"'This becomes particularly evident when the United States must bring suit
in foreign courts in order to enforce contractual rights.
"McCauley, American Courts in Germany, 40 A. B. A. J. 1041-1045 (1954):
Clark and Goodman, American Justice in Occupied Germany, 36 A. B. A. J. 443
(1950) ; Nobleman, Military Government Courts; Law and Order in the American
Zone of Germany, 33 A. B. A. J. 777 (1947).
" U. S. High Commissioner Laws Nos. 38 and 40, amending U. S. High Com-
missioner Law No. 20.
" See Lobingier, Precedent in Past and Present Legal Systems, 44 Micu. L.
REv. 955 (1946) ; 40 C. J., Modern Civil Law § 6 (1926). Rodin, Case Law and
Stare Decisis, 33 CoL. L. REv. 199 (1933) ; Pound, Theory of Judicial Decisions,
36 HARv. L. Rxv. 641-649 (1923).
"s Breedlove v. Turner, 9 Mart. (Old Ser.) 353 (La. 1821) ; Schlesinger, Com-
parative Law Cases and Materials, p. 265 (1950).
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since they did not constitute the law of the state. To this the Louisiana
Supreme Court replied:
"The next objection, that the lawyers practising in this state
are not under any necessity of noticing the judgments given by
the Supreme Court, has certainly the merit of novelty, to justify
an examination of its correctness.
In support of this position, a great deal of time was occupied
in showing, that the decisions were not law; that nothing could
be properly called so, but those acts passed by that branch of our
government, in whom the power of legislation is vested by the
constitution. This is true, and we never before supposed that
they were so considered. But as we are obliged, by our duty, to
decide on every question that is brought before us, and, as many
of these questions turn on ascertaining the true meaning of the
lawmaker, when the expressions used are ambiguous, whether
that ambiguity be considered in relation to the language used in
the act, or the applicability of the provision to particular cases;
I had supposed it not doubted, that the decisions of this tribunal
were to be regarded as the interpretation of the legislative will;
as an exposition of its meaning and intention. And that, until
the legislative authority, by subsequent acts, chose to make differ-
ent provisions on the subject, that it is an acquiescence on their
part, that the court fairly understood their meaning, and wisely
and faithfully expounded it. There is, also, a variety of questions
presented for decision, where positive law is silent, and where
recourse must be had to legal analogies, to arrive at truth. Are
not the decisions which this court makes, amid the frequent con-
flicting opinions of foreign jurists, to be received as determining
which doctrine is in force here? We are told not; that recourse
must be had to the law itself, and that law is found where? In
some obscure commentator, who lived, perhaps, some centuries
ago, and who is quoted, triumphantly, as better evidence of what
is a rule of action for the people of Louisiana, than the decisions
of men, who, whatever in other respects be their abilities, have at
least the advantage of using the knowledge and the learning that
latter times have produced-who enjoy the light of the age in
which they live, and who have the aid of able counsel, discussing
every subject on which they are called to pronounce an opinion.
This, then, is the fair extent to which the authority of the
decisions of this tribunal may be carried. They are evidence of
what the law is, under such circumstances, as has just been stated,
and as is the duty of the court to see that they are correct, and
1955]
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that they are uniform; so, also, it is important, that society should
know, that we feel ourselves bound by them, unless we are clearly,
and beyond doubt, satisfied that they are contrary to law or the
constitution, and that we never can consider it a proper discharge
of duty in any member of the bar, who pursues his profession with
an avowed determination to disregard them.
' 'lsa
There exists judge-made law in every civil law country, even though
its civil code may not contain an explicit authorization, such as Article
I of the Swiss Civil Code.19 Thus, for example, in France and in the
Scandinavian countries, the principle of strict liability of owners of
motor vehicles is a judge-made product.20  German courts established
judge-made law, such as the theory of culpa in contrahendo,2 1 antic-
ipatory breach of contract,2 2 clausula rebus sic stantibus,23 mitiga-
18a Ibid.
" Article I of the Swiss Civil Code reads as follows:
"The statute governs all matter within the letter of spirit of any of its man-
dates. In default of an applicable statute, the judge is to pronounce judg-
ment according to the customary law, and in default of custom according
to the rules which he would establish if he were to assume the part of a
legislator. He is to draw his inspiration, however, from the solutions of the
learned (la doctrine) and the jurisprudence of the courts (la jurispru-
dence) ."
This provision has been made the subject of study by WILLIAMS, THE SOURCES
OF LAW IN THE SWISS CIVIL CODE (1923).
" Ussing, The Scandinavian Law of Torts, 1 AM. J. CoMP. LAw 359 (1952);
Esmein, Liability in French Law for Dmage Caused by Motor Vehicle Accidents,
2 Am. J. Comp. LAW 156 (1953). See also Deak, Automobile Accidents: A
Comparative Study of the Law of Liability in Europe, 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 271
(1931) ; as to trends in U. S. A., see Grad, Recent Developments in Aiuto Acci-
dent Compensation, 50 COL. L. Rav. 300 (1950).
2 Under the theory of culpa in contrahendo the entertainment of negotiations
results in contractual obligations of the parties to tell each other the truth, to
protect each other's physical integrity, etc. See Schwenk, Culpa in Contrahendo in
German, French and Louisiana Law, 15 TULANE L. REV. 87 (1940).
22 Under this theory, an action for damages exists in instances similar to those
of anticipatory breach of contract in American law. See decisions of the former
German Supreme Court in 1RG.Z. 54, 102; 63, 423; 67, 7; 111, 303; 129, 282;
130, 301; 131, 358; 161, 338; 134, 87; 106, 25.
2 Under the theory of clausula rebus sic stantibus every contract contains the
condition precedent that the facts existing at the time when the contract is entered
into remain the same. Later the theory was changed to the effect that a contract
remains effective only as long as there is no change of the basic facts existing at
the time when the contract is concluded. The theory of clausula rebus sic
stantibus was embodied in the Prussian Law (Allgemeine Landrecht, para. 377,
I, 5). However, when the German Civil Code took the place of that Law, it was
not incorporated in the Code (See Motives relating to the German Civil Code, II,
199, 315). As a result, the German Supreme Court first refused to apply the
theory of clausula rebus sic stantibus (R. G. Z. 550-57). In fact, the theory that
a contract is valid only as long as the surrounding facts remain the same, was
never fully recognized (R. G. Z. 147, 56; J. W. 38, 862). Nevertheless, the
theory was applied in Germany in instances in which changes occurred as a result
of World War I, revolution and inflation (R.G.J.W. 37, 2036; R. G. Z. 100, 130).
Finally, it was applied in cases in which circumstances existing at the time, when
the contract came into existence, changed to such an extent that performance of
the contract cannot be reasonably expected from one or another party (R. G. Z.
[Vol. 33
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tion of damages,24 etc. Furthermore, they adjusted provisions of a
copyright statute enacted in 1901 by judicial process to the modern needs
brought about by radio and record players.25  Finally, in connection
with the provision 28 of the new German constitution providing for equal
rights for men and women, German courts must not only invalidate
numerous provisions of the German Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure
and Statutes inconsistent with it, but also determine the law which
takes the place of the invalidated provisions.2 7  The German Federal
Constitutional Court-supreme court in constitutional matters-held
that this function of the German courts is judicial and not legislative
and that it is, therefore, not repugnant to the doctrine of separation of
powers, as laid down in the German constitution.
28
b. Stare decisis in. civil law countries
It is frequently said that the common law may be distinguished
from the civil law by the rule of stare decisis. In the Anglo-American
system this rule does not necessarily mean that courts may not depart
from precedent in order to vindicate plain and obvious principles of law
and to remedy injustice or to keep up with social evolution.2 9  The
doctrine also exists, with varying degrees of elasticity, in civil law coun-
tries. In fact, some civil law countries such as Germany have put teeth
in the doctrine of stare decisis. Thus, if the civil panel (i.e., the panel
for civil cases) of the German Supreme Court wishes to depart from
precedent set by another civil panel, the case must be submitted for
determination to the Grand Senate, consisting of the President and eight
152, 403; 153, 358; 160, 256; B. G. H. 2, 188). As to the clausula rebus sic
stantibus under the Swiss Civil Code, see SCHLESINGER, ComPARATIVE LAW, 324-
332 (1950).
"4 Under the theory of mitigation of damages (compensatio lucri curn dainno)
a person who is entitled to damages must reduce them to the extent to which
he obtained a gain from the event causing the damages (breach of contract, tort).
See Decisions of the former German Supreme Court in R. G. Z. 554, 141; 80,
154; 84, 389; 146, 278; 152, 401; 153, 265.
2 G. and D. Reinicke, Die Fortbildung des Rechts durch den Richter, NEUE
JURISTISCHE W0CHENScHRIFT 54, 1217-1222.
2 Article 3 of the German Basic Law (Constitution) provides:
"1. All men shall be equal before the law.
2. Men and women shall have equal rights.
3. No one may be prejudiced or privileged because of his sex, descent, race,
language, homeland and origin, faith or his religion and political opinions."
21 See NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 53, 903, 984, 1104, 1222, 1351, 1538,
1772; 54, 76, 145, 151, 159, 349, 837, 839, 840, 1161, 1301, 1522; DEUTSCHE RiCH-
ERZEITUNG 53, 169; DEUTSCHE OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 53, 456.
"Decision of 18 December 1953 published in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHEN-
SCHRIFT 53, 65. In an advisory opinion of 6 September 1953 the German Supreme
Court has reached the same concfusion, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 54,
347.
29 State v. Aiken, 42 S. C. 222, 20 S.E. 221 (1894) ; Carroll v. Local No. 269
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 133 N. J. Eq. 144, 31 A. 2d 223
(Ch. 1943); McKenna v. Austin, 134 F. 2d 659, 666 (1943); United States v.
State of Minnesota, 113 F. 2d 770, 774 (1940).
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judges.30  The same is true in criminal cases. 31  Moreover, if a civil
panel desires to depart from a precedent set by a criminal panel (i.e.,
a panel in criminal cases) and vice versa, the so-called Combined Grand
Senate, consisting of the President of the court and all members of the
Grand Senate, must hear and decide the case.3 2 Finally, many decisions
of the Federal Constitutional Court are binding upon constitutional
organs, courts, and government agencies.3 3  Others have the force of
law.
3 4
III. THE LAW OF EQUITY AND TRUSTS IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES
In the Anglo-American system the law of equity has been developed
by equity courts. To a substantial degree these courts owe their exist-
ence to the fact that the common law judges set themselves with an iron
determination against any modification of the doctrine and rules estab-
lished by precedent. 35 In civil law countries equity is not known as a
special branch of law. However, such concepts as estoppel, the doctrine
of clean hands, rescission of contracts for mistake, fraud and duress,
reformation, assignments, relief from contractual forfeitures and penal-
ties, suits for accounting, enforcement of arbitration awards, and writs
of injunction have either been incorporated as specific legal provisions in-
to the substantive or adjective law of civil law countries or developed by
the courts.36 In addition, civil codes contain general provisions requiring
equitable considerations in regard to interpretation of contracts, 37 per-
formance of obligations 38 and exercise of rights.39  Consequently, while
the results obtained by the civil law concept of equity and the Anglo-
American law of equity are similar, they are not identical. Thus, while
under the Anglo-American law of equity specific performance may be
"3 Section 136 I of the German Court Organisation Law (Gerichtsverfassungs-
gesetz).
'3 Ibid.
" Section 136 II of the German Court Organisation Law (Gerichtsverfassungs-
gesetz).
" Section 31 I Federal Constitutional Court Law (Bundesverfassungsgerichts-
gesetz). See also Schaefer, Gesetzeskraft und bindende Wirkung der Entscheid-
ungen des Bundesverfassztngsgerichtes, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 54,
1465-1469 (1954).
"' Section 31 II Federal Constitutional Court Law (Bundesverfassungsgerichts-
gesetz). See Schaefer, op. cit. supra note 33.
1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 16 (5th ed. 1941).
See, for example, Sections 119-123, 157, 226, 242, 398-413, German Civil
Code. See also Sections 935-945, German Code of Civil Procedure.
" Section 157 of the German Civil Code provides that contracts shall be in-
terpreted in a reasonable way with due regard to customs.
S Section 242 of the German Civil Code provides that the debtor shall perform
in a reasonable way with due regard to customs.
"0 Section 226 of the German Civil Code provides that the exercise of a right
is not permissible if it serves only the purpose of inflicting damage upon another
person. On this provision, see Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMB. L. J. 22,
32-39 (1933) ; SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 333-341 (1950).
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obtained only where damages are inadequate or impracticable,40 the
civil law, as a rule, recognizes the right to specific performance of all
contractual obligations.41 They may be enforced by contempt of court
process or by third parties at the debtor's expense.4 2
Similarly, civil law countries have no equivalent to the Anglo-
American law of trusts43  This appears to be strange, since Roman law
developed the fidei conmissum,44 a trust device, and Germanic law the
"Salman" or "Treuhand," 45 a similar trust device, both historical ante-
cedents of the English uses and the modern Anglo-American trust. The
first English trusts were created to evade the Statute of Mortmain, for-
bidding religious groups to hold land. Although similar prohibitions are
known in civil law countries, the law of trusts did not develop as a
special branch. It has been said that objectives accomplished by the
Anglo-American law of trusts have been obtained in civil law countries
by substitute devices, such as grant of unlimited power of attorney, foun-
dation, usufruct, fidei commissurn, and others.4 6  However, these de-
vices cannot be compared with the Anglo-American law of trusts.4 7
While the law of trusts itself determines the liability of the settlor, trustee,
and cestui que trust, a stipulation by the parties in civil law countries is
required to reach similar results. The difference is manifest. For in-
stance, where under the Anglo-American law of trusts a constructive
trust comes into existence, the civil law system remains helpless. Thus,
if property is conveyed from A to B in trust for A, and B sells the
property to C in violation of the trust, A's equities are cut off under the
civil law system, even though C may not be a bona fide purchaser for
value. As a result, in the civil law system A's only remedy is a cause of
action against B for damages upon breach of contract,48 while under
the Anglo-American rule of trust pursuit a constructive trust results in
favor of A.
49
4°4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1401-1403 (5th ed. 1941).
41 Section 362 I, German Civil Code.
12 Sections 887 and 888, German Code of Civil Procedure.
" Garrigues, Law of Trusts, 2 AM. J. Com p. LAW 25-35 (1953) ; Bolgar,
Why No Trusts in the Civil Law?, 2 Am. J. ComP. LAW 204 (1953).
" See McDonogh's Executors v. Murdoch, 15 How. (U. S.) 367, 14 L. Ed. 732
(1853), discussing the Roman fidet comnissure and the fidei commissum of the
Louisiana Code, and of the Spanish and French Law.
" See Ames, The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 HARV. L. REv. 261, 265 (1908).
" Nussbaum, Sociological and Comparative Aspects of the Trust, 38 COL. L.
REv. 416 (1938) ; Batiffol, The Trust Problem as Seen by a French Lawyer, 33
JOURNAL OF COM:PARATIVE LEGISLATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1951);
Huber, Trust and Treuhand in Swiss Law, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARA-
TIVE LAW QUARTERLY 66 (1952) ; Meyer, Trusts and Swiss Law, 1 THE INTERNA-
TIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 379 (1952).
"' Garrigues, Law of Trusts, 2 Am. J. ComfP. LAW 35 (1953).
".This follows from the relationship "in personam" as compared with that "in
rem." On the distinction between rights in rem and in personain, see Bolgar, Why
No Trusts in the Civil Law?. 1 Am. J. Comp. LAW 218 (1952).
" 54 AM. JuR., Trusts §§ 248, 266 (1945).
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IV. THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
One might assume that in times in which trade and commerce are
carried on upon a world-wide basis, the principles of formation of con-
tracts would be identical in all countries. Unfortunately, this is not
the case. Thus, while under common law an offer is not binding and
may be made binding only if made under seal or for a consideration,50
in the civil law an offer is binding for a reasonable period of time, or if
it is not so binding, it may be made so without any consideration. 1
While consideration is an essential requirement for a legally en-
forceable promise in the common law,52 it is not so required in the civil
law. The reasons therefor are historical. While in the common law
the enforcement of contractual obligations has grown out of the action
for assumpsit-which includes consideration as an essential element-
enforcement of contracts in civil law countries originated from the
Roman law of contracts under which the doctrine of consideration is
unknown. Nevertheless, consideration is not an entirely foreign concept
in the civil law: as in the common law, it furnishes the test for the dis-
tinction between gift promises and others.5 3 In the civil law a gift
promise requires compliance with certain form requirements, 4 unless it
is actually performed.
While common law contracts must be in writing under the circum-
stances set forth by the Statute of Frauds and while compliance with
the Statute of Frauds is a matter of procedural rather than substantive
law,5 5 the codes in civil law countries prescribe various form require-
ments for various contracts. In some instances contracts must be in
writing,56 in others they must be made before a notary public or a
court.57 The purpose of these attestations is to force the parties to con-
sider carefully the consequences of their stipulations before they affix
their signature to the contract. As a result, by judicial determination,
these form requirements have been extended to preliminary contracts by
o RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS § 35(e) (1932); Hargrove v. Crawford, 159 Iowa
522, 141 N. W. 423 (1913); Night Co. v. Brown, 213 Mich. 214, 181 N. W. 979
(1921).
" See, e.g., Section 145, German Civil Code. See also CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 38 (1950) ; SCHL-SINGER, COmPARATIVE LAW 294 (1950).
51RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 75 (1932); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 110, 111
(1950).
' For the common law, this idea was spelled out in Stonestreet v. Southern Oil
Co., 226 N. C. 261, 37 S. E. 2d 676 (1946) as follows: "He gave nothing for it,
loses nothing by it, and upon its breach he suffers no recoverable damages."
" Pursuant to Section 518, German Civil Code, a gift promise must be made
before a notary public or court.
" SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 62 (1954).
Go E.g., the German Civil Code prescribes writing for suretyship (Section 766),
assignment of mortgages (Section 1154), leases covering a period of more than one
year (Section 566), promise or recognizance of a debt (Sections 780 and 781).
I E.g., The German Civil Code prescribes recording before a notary public or
court in case of sale of property (Section 313), gift promises (Section 518), etc.
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which the parties bind themselves to enter into main contracts for which
compliance with formal requirements is required.58
In the common law system contracts are not enforceable if they are
made illegal by statute or violate public policy, as declared by the
courts. 59 Civil law countries impose similar restrictions on the freedom
of contract.60 Thus, in the German Civil Code contracts are null and
void if they violate statutory provisions, unless such provisions are not
directed against their validity.61 Furthermore, contracts are null and
void if they violate good morals.
2
V. THE LAW OF TORTs
As in Anglo-American common law, actions for negligence consti-
tute the bulk of the law of torts in civil law countries.03  However,
actions for negligence may be confined in civil law countries to instances
in which damage has been inflicted upon specific objects, such as life,
body, health, freedom, and property.6 4 A general clause such as "other
rights of another person" may or may not extend the list of protected
values.
As a general rule, actions for negligence require either intent or
negligence. While under both systems the concept of "intent" is well
settled, there exists a diversity of opinion in the civil law countries as
to whether the test for negligence is objective (i.e., conduct of a
reasonable person) or subjective (i.e., conduct of the tortfeasor). It
would seem that the objective theory is prevailing in civil law coun-
tries.6 5
Under both the Anglo-American and the civil law systems, the theory
of "res ipsa loquitur"6 6 has relieved the plaintiff in certain tort actions
20 See decision of the former German Supreme Court in R. G. Z. 104, 132.
SIMPSON, CONTRAcTS § 175 (1954).
0 See, e.g., Sections 134 and 138, German Civil Code.
01 Section 134, German Civil Code.
• The concept of "good morals" is as sweeping as "public. policy." See
SCHILESING R, COMPARATivE LAW 307-324 (1950).
03 See Section 823, German Civil Code; Article 1382, French Civil Code.
,Section 823, German Civil Code. See, however, Articles 1382 2nd 1383,
French Civil Code."2 Decision of the former and present German Supreme Court in R. G. Z. 119,
397; 152, 140; B.G.H. 8, 141. However, the views of the groups of persons to
whom the tortfeasor belongs, should be taken into account, R. G. Z. 113, 426; 126,
331; 152, 140.
0" Braun, Res Ipsa Loquitur in the District of Columbia, 20 JOURNAL OF THE
BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE DISTRIcT OF COLUMBIA, 157-165, 218-225 (1953) ; Note,
52 COL. L. REv. 551 (1952) ; Baker, An Eclipse of Fault Liability, 40 VA. L. REv.
276 (1951) ; McLarty, Res Ispsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation, 35 VA.
L. REv. 55 (1951) ; Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BUFFALO L. REv. 1-15
(1951) ; Dewey, A Tare in the Field of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 19 U. OF GIN. L. REv.
415-459 (1950) ; Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 643 (1950); Shain, Presumptions Under the Common and Ciil Law, 18
So. CALIF. L. REV. 91 (1944) ; Shain, Res Ipsa Loquitur, 17 So. CALIF. L. REv. 187
(1944) ;'Arthur, Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied in Dental Cases, 15 ROCKY MT. L.
REv. 220 (1943) ; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509 (1940).
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from the burden of proof for negligence. However, the effect of that
theory is not comparable with that of the principle of liability without
fault, since it permits only the inference that the defendant's neglect
caused the injury complained of. While in the Anglo-American law
under the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher67 only a limited number of
instances of liability without fault for "ultra-hazardous activities" has
been recognized, 8 the civil law has extended the doctrine to all cases in
which persons own, keep or operate dangerous instrumentalities. 9 Thus,
by explicit provisions of the German Civil Code, the keepers of animals,
domestic or wild, are liable for the mischief done by the animals re-
gardless of whether their keepers know of their viciousness. 70 Fur-
thermore, the owners of buildings are liable for damages if damage to
property or injury to person is ca'used by the collapse of building or
scaffold or by the separation of parts of a building or scaffold.71
It is due to the principle of equity rather than the doctrine of danger-
ous instrumentalities that under German law tort liability of insane
persons or children exists if, in the view of the circumstances-par-
ticularly in view of conditions regarding the parties-equity requires the
payment of damages and if the defendant's own support or compliance
with legal obligations to support others is not affected by such payment.
72
Inasmuch as this provision ultimately hinges upon the wealth of insane
persons or children, it is doubtful whether it would be consistent with
the equal rights provision of the Constitution of the United States.
In Germany, liability without fault has been extended by legislation
to owners of automobiles78 and railroads. 74 However, this liability is
not unqualified. It may be defeated by showing that the most careful
person could not have avoided the accident.75 Other civil law countries
Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 1 Ex. 265, aft'd, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 519-524 (1938). McBratney, New Trends Toward
Liability without Fault, 26 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 140-153 (1954); Leflar, Negligence
in Name Only, 27 N. Y. U. L. REv. 564-584 C1952) ; Gregory, Trespass to Negli-
gence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359-397 (1951).
"' Bolgar, Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation: Types and Trends, 2 Aixi. J.
ComP. LAw 516 (1953); Ussing, The Scandinavian Law of Torts, 1 Aix. J.
ComP. LAW 362 (1952) ; Esmein, Liability in French Law for Damages Caused by
Motor Vehicle Accidents, 2 Am. J. ComP. LAW 156 (1953). As to the United
States, see Grad, Recent Developments in Auto Accident Compensation, 50 COL.
L. REv. 300 (1950).
70 Section 833, German Civil Code.
71 Section 836, German Civil Code.
Section 829, German Civil Code. See Stone, Liability for Damage Caused
by Minors: A Comparative Study, 5 ALA. L. Rxv. 1-35 (1952).
' Strassenverkehrsgesetz of 19 December 1952 (B. G. B1. I 837).
7, Gesetz betr. die Verbindlichkeit zum Schadensersatz fuer die bei dem Betriebe
von Eisenbahnen, Bergwerken usw. herbeigefuehrten Toetungen und Koerperverletz-
ungen (Reichshaftpflichtgesetz) of 7 June 1871 (R. G. B1. 207), as amended;
Gesetz ueber die Haftpflicht der Eisenbahnen und Strassenbahnen fuer Sachschaeden
of 29 April 1940 (R. G. B1. I 691).
" Section 7 II, Strassenverkehrsgesetz; Section 1, Reichsbaftpflicbtgesetz.
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apply the doctrine of liability without fault to owners of automobiles,
railroads, and airplanes as a result of judicial determination. 76  On the
other hand, the doctrine of respondeat superior may be qualified in the
civil law by the proviso that superiors may exonerate themselves from
liability by showing that they exercised due care in selecting and super-
vising the tortfeasor.
77
The question as to whether damage to property or injury to person
has been "caused" by the defendant to the plaintiff has vexed the courts
in civil law countries as much as it has under the Anglo-American
system.7 8  A specific provision79 in the civil law prescribing that the
tortfeasor must restore, either in fact or by payment of damages, the
condition which would exist in the absence of the commission of the
tort, has not resulted in any solution of the problem. While in the field
of criminal law the theory of the "but for" or "sine qua non" rule-te
most logical doctrine of causationS°-was declared to be applicable,8 ' it
yielded to the theory of proximate cause in torts law, on the ground that
it would extend liability beyond the scope determined by the objective
.standard for negligence and by numerous instances of liability without
fault.8 2
In addition to the general provision on negligence, Civil Codes pro-
vide for specific torts. The most interesting provision appears to be
the liability of the government for acts of its officials. The doctrine that
"the king can do no wrong" is unknown even in those civil law coun-
tries in which absolute or constitutional monarchy prevailed.8 3  As a
result, governments are liable for torts committed by their officials in
C7 Bolgar, Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation: Types and Trends, 2 Am. J.
Comp. LAW 515 (1953) ; Esmein, Liability in French Law for Damages Caused
by Motor Vehicle Accidents, 2 Am. J. Comp. LAw 156 (1953) ; LAwsoN, NEaLi-
GENCE IN THE CiVI LAW 43, 44 (Oxford, 1950) ; Deak, Automobile Accidents:
A Comparative Study of the Law of Liability in Europe, 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 271
.1931) ; Heuberger, Der Tier-, Automobil- und Flugzeughalter imr schweizerischen
Haftpflichtrecht, 101 ABHANDLUNGEN ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN RECHT, N. F. 1935,
58, 59.
"' See Section 831, German Civil Code.
"'James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Mat in Negligence Cases, 16 Miss.
L. REV. 1-26 (1951) ; Prosser, Proximate Cause it California, 38 CALIF. L. Ryv.
369-425 (1950) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 45 (1941).
"' See Section 249, German Civil Code.
so The former German Supreme Court expressed the opinion in R. G. Z. 81,
360 that from a philosophical-logical and scientific point of view the "but for" or"condicio sine qua non" rule is the most logical theory of causation.
"' See the decisions of the former German Supreme Court in R. G. St. 63, 213;
61, 319; 44, 244.
2 See Decisions of the former and present German Supreme Court in R. G. Z.
81, 361; 104, 143; 133, 27; 148, 165; 152, 401; 155, 41; 158, 38; 168, 88; 169, 91;
NEUE JUR STISCHE WOCHENSCHRiFT 52, 1010; B. G. H. 2, 138; 3, 267; 7, 204.
" Thus in Germany, government liability for government officials was created
prior to the establishment of the Weimar Republic (1918) by the Prussian Law of
August 1, 1909 (GS 691), Reich Law of May 22, 1910 (R. G. B1. 798), and Sec-
tion 12, Grundbuchordnung of 24 March 1897 (R. G. Bi. 139), as amended.
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the exercise of governmental functions.8 4 In fact, the law protects gov-
ernment officials by prohibiting tort suits by third persons against them
for official action taken. s5 Whether the government may take recourse
against negligent officials, is, of course, another question. 86
VI. THE CRIMINAL LAW
Comparative law is not confined to civil litigation. A comparative
study of criminal law would certainly be a valuable contribution to legis-
lative policy considerations, particularly since-contrary to the modern-
ization of civil law-criminal law has not undergone substantive changes.
Take, for example, the case in which a person attempts an offense and
then withdraws voluntarily. Under the common law such a person is
guilty of the crime of attempt to commit an offense, although his vol-
untary withdrawal might be considered a mitigating circumstance. 87
Under many civil law systems such a person has not committed an
offense, 8 the policy consideration being that the criminal offender who
has not progressed beyond the stage of an attempt should be encour-
aged to abandon it voluntarily. It is doubtful whether under these
systems the commission of an included completed offense is still punish-
able."9
At the time when the United States ratified the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement, it passed a resolution which provides, among other
things:
"In giving its advice and consent to ratification, it is the sense
of the Senate that:
1. The criminal jurisdiction provisions of Article VII do not
constitute a precedent for future agreements;
2. Where a person subject to military jurisdiction of the
United States is to be tried by the authorities of a receiving state,
under the treaty the Commanding Officer of the armed forces
of the United States in such state shall examine the laws of such
See Article 34, German Basic Law (Constitution)."See decision of the former German Supreme Court in R. G. Z. 163, 89.
"Article 34, Basic Law (Constitution) provides that the Government may take
recourse against the official, if he acted intentionally or with gross negligence.
With regard to the right of the United States to recover damages from employees
for which it is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671
et seq. (1952), see U. S. v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507 (1954).
8' People v. Marrs, 125 Mich. 376, 84 N. W. 284 (1900) ; Glover v. Comm., 86
Va. 382, 10 S. E. 420 (1889). See also State v. McCarthy, 115 Kan. 583, 224
Pac. 44 (1924) ; Comm. v. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 42 Atl. 374 (1899) ; Comm. v. Less-
ner, 274 Pa. 108, 118 Atl. 24 (1922). CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMEs § 121 (1952).
To the contrary, 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 226 (1932).
"'See, e.g., Section 46, German Criminal Code.
25 See Decision of the former German Supreme Court in R. G. St. 15, 12; 23,
225.
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state with particular reference to the procedural safeguards con-
tained in the Constitution of the United States;
3. If, in the opinion of such commanding officer, under all
the circumstances of the case, there is danger that the accused
will not be protected because of the absence or denial of consti-
tutional rights he would enjoy in the United States, the command-
ing officer shall request the authorities of the receiving state to
waive jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
3 (c) of Article VII (which requires the receiving state to give
'sympathetic consideration' to such request) and if such authorities
refuse to waive jurisdiction, the commanding officer shall request
the Department of State to press such request through diplomatic
channels and notification shall be given by the Executive Branch
to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of
Representatives."
By its terms the aforementioned resolution places a duty on the mil-
itary authorities of the United States in the receiving state to examine
the law of all NATO countries from the viewpoint of and with particu-
lar reference to the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Consti-
tution of the United States. If, in a particular case, there is any danger
that the accused, who is subject to the military law of the sending state,
will not be protected because of the absence or denial of a constitutional
right he would have enjoyed in the United States, a request for a waiver
of the receiving state's primary jurisdiction will be made by the com-
manding officer of the Armed Forces of the United States in such state.
Any refusal to waive jurisdiction is to be disposed of by intergovern-
mental communications on the diplomatic level, and a report thereof is
to be made to the Senate and House Armed Services Committee.
As a result of this Resolution, comparative studies have been made
to determine whether there is danger that the accused will not be pro-
tected because of the absence or denial, by the laws of the receiving state,
of constitutional rights which he would enjoy in the United States.90
Such studies require a thorough examination of the laws of criminal
procedure in all NATO countries in which United States Forces are
stationed. 91 This appears to be the first instance of the study of com-
90 It is obvious that the constitutional safeguards to which the Senate referred
are not co-extensive with the limitations placed on the Federal Government in
civilian courts, since many of these limitations are not applicable in state courts
or military tribunals. A reasonable interpretation of the Senate Resolution indicates
that a foreign government should not be required to extend rights to persons to
which they would not be entitled in the country of their origin. It follows that the
constitutional safeguards referred to in the Resolution are those minimal rights
which apply in all state courts in the United States.
" Criminal procedure in all NATO countries other than Great Britain differs
greatly from that in the United States. Whereas trials in the United States con-
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parative law being required by a legislative body of the United States.
It is a significant indication that in these days a knowledge of domestic
law alone is not sufficient.
VII. CONCLUSION
The study of comparative law has emerged from the era of aca-
demic luxury into the arena of practical necessity. As a consequence,
comparative law shoult be taught not only in a few law schools, as is
the case at present, but as a regular course of the law school curriculum.
If this development takes place on an international scale-and there is
some indication that it may-it can be hoped that some day all citizens
will be governed by substantially the same rules of civil and criminal
law. Perhaps at the end of this development there will be one law for
one world.
9 2
stitute adversary proceedings in which each party is charged by law and custom
with specific responsibilities and specific rights and, at least in jury trials, the
judge is confined to rulings on questions of law, criminal procedure in European
countries imposes upon the judge the duty to examine the defendant as well as the
witnesses during the trial, and thus to restrict the role of the prosecuting attorney
and defense counsel in a manner unknown in the United States.
92 McDougal, Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes, 1 Am. J. Coaip.
LAw 34 (1952); Sturges, The Quest for World Law and Order, 22 TULANE
L. REv. 558 (1948); Riesenfeld, Review, 3 J. LEGAL EDUc. 620 (1951); Soyre,
Review, 36 IowA L. Ray. 585 (1951) ; Hazard, Comparative Law in Legal Educa-
tiOnt, 18 U. OF CHI. L. Ray. 264 (1951).
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